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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
federal courts, although the courts of Michigan are contra.6 Neither the
Supreme Court of Ohio nor any appeals court has yet ruled upon this ques-
tion.
In Vukovic v. Walnut Grove County Club, a personal injury case,
plaintiff's physician testified in her behalf. On cross-examination, without
objection by plaintiff, and upon re-direct, the witness was interrogated
fully as to her physical condition and case history. This procedure con-
stituted a voluntary waiver of plaintiff's rights under the physician-patient
privilege statute,8 and defendant was properly permitted to introduce in
evidence a written statement of plaintiff's physician relating to her physical
condition, including some family history which the physician had obtained
while attending her in his professional capacity.
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FUTURE INTERESTS
Construction of Deeds
To B for life "then to the heirs of his body their heirs
and assigns forever."
The conveyances by will and -by deed of various tracts of land by
Samuel B. Hoppes, his wife, and their four children are the subjeot of the
declaratory judgment in Hoppes v. American National Red Cross.'
In 1912, A (Samuel B. Hoppes) conveyed by deed a tract of land to his
son, B (John Hinton Hoppes) "for the term of his natural life, then to the
heirs of his body, their heirs and assigns forever." B reconveyed to A in
fee simple. A reconveyed to B in fee simple. B mortgaged this tract in
1939, 1948, 1953 and 1954. In 1954 B devised to the American National
Red Cross the net proceeds from the sale of this tract. The Fayette County
Court of Common Pleas, in its opinion, assumed that B received an estate
in fee tail for his life. It is difficult to understand how the court reached
this conclusion since the cases which the court relied upon involve con-
veyances "to B and the heirs of his body." If the conveyance in 1912 in
the Hoppes case had been "to B for life, remainder to the heirs of his
body," the court might properly have held that B received a life estate, and
by the operation of the Rule in Shelley's case a vested -remainder in fee
tail, which would merge to give B the fee tail estate.2 The Ohio Statute
' People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
7124 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio App. 1953).
OHio GEN. CODE § 11494 (Now OHIo REV. CODE § 2317.02).
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would then convert B's fee tail into an estate in fee tail for his life with a
contingent interest (possibly a remainder) in fee simple in the heirs of his
body.3 The reversion would be in A. The deeds from B -to A in fee simple
and from A to B in fee simple would not destroy the interest of B's issue
(heirs of his body) because of the specific Ohio statute and also because at
the common law the interest of the issue in a fee tail estate could not be
destroyed by merger.
But, the conveyance to B in the Hoppes case was "to B for the term of
his natural life, then to the heirs of his body their heirs and assigns forever."
(Emphasis supplied). The words "heirs of his body" were probably used
as words of purchase, and the words "their heirs and assigns forever" were
probably use as words of limitation. Consequently, this language might be
construed as creating the following estates: life estate in B, contingent re-
mainder in fee simple in the heirs of B's body, reversion in fee simple in A
defeasible on the death of B survived by heirs of his body.4 The contin-
gent remainder under common law principles would -be destroyed when
B surrendered his life estate to A.5 B received the fee simple absolute
when A reconveyed to B in fee simple. The writer believes that the
attorney who prepared the surrender by B of his life estate to A intended
to destroy the contingent remainder in the heirs of B's body. A sur-
render (reconveyance) by the life tenant to the reversioner was a normal
way of destroying contingent remainders at the common law. Also, the
deed of reconveyance specifically recites that its purpose was "to vest the
fee simple title to said premises in the grantee."
Since the son, B, died survived by no heirs of his body, the court's
construction and the 'suggested construction of the remainder "to the
heirs of his body their heirs and assigns forever," both support the con-
clusion that the American National Red Cross is entitled to the net
proceeds and that the tract is subject to the liens of the four mortgages.
'128 N.E.2d 851 (Ohio Com. PL 1955).
2 The Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished as to gifts "by will to any person for his
life, and after his death to heirs in fee" as of October 1, 1940. 38 Ohio Laws 120
(1840). It was not abolished as to conveyances by deed until August 21, 1951.
119 Ohio Laws 348 (1941).
aBy statute effective June 1, 1812 "all estates given in tail shall be and remain an
absolute estate in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail." 3 REy. STAT. OF
OfIo 2293 (Cutwen 1811).
'Williams v. Hailer, 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 329 (1912); Whitson v. Barnett, 237
N.C. 483, 75 S.E.2d 391 (1953). Contra, Sybert v. Sybert, 152 Tex. 106, 254
S.W.2d 999 (1953), (to, B for life only, then "to rest in fee simple in the heirs of
his body").
'See White, Some Ohio Problems As to Future Interests it Land, 1 U. CN. L Rv.
36 (1927). A statute which became effective January 1, 1932 provides that "An
expectant estate cannot be defeated. . . by ... merger." OHIO Ray. CODE § 2131.06.
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However, if B had died survived by heirs of his body, under the sug-
gested construction the contingent remainder would have been destroyed
by merger. But, under the court's construction, the heirs of B's body
would have taken under the Ohio statute relating to fee tail estates.
The fact that the court treated the words "heirs of his body" as words
of limitation and not as words of purchase and ignored completely the
words "their heirs and assigns forever" will make more difficult the
draftsman's problem of setting forth the estates intended to be created by
a will or deed.
Construction of Wills
Reference to Expected Title
The second question before the court in the Hoppes case involved
a devise by John Hinton Hoppes to three children of his brother. This
devise was preceded by the following recital as to testator's source of
title:
whereas my mother, Nancy Hoppes, has made a will devising to me fifty
acres of land... in the event that I shall survive her and inherit from her
said land, I give and devise said land to...
John Hinton Hoppes executed his will in 1946 and died in 1954. In
1951 he received under his mother's will only a life estate, but in 1952,
by deeds from all the remaindermen, he received the fee simple. The
court properly held that the recital in John's will was not a limitation but
only a statement as to how he expected to receive the title in fee simple.
Remainder to Testator's Grandchildren
The third question before the court in the Hoppes case involved the
will of Samuel B. Hoppes. Samuel died in 1935. He apparently de-
vised a present life estate to his wife (who died in 1951) because the
portion of Samuel's will which is quoted in the opinion reads in part as
follows:
After the death of my said wife, Nancy Hoppes, I give and devise...
two farms . .. to my son John Hinton Hoppes, during his natural life.
After the death of my said son, John Hinton Hoppes, I give and devise
said Real Estate to my grandchildren, their heirs and assigns forever abso-
lutely and in fee simple, each to share equally.
One of Samuel's grandchildren, who was living when Samuel died, prede-
ceased his uncle, John Hinton Hoppes. This grandchild was unmarried
and was survived by his parents who are still living.
The court properly held that survival by the grandchildren of Samuel
until the termination of all life estates was not a condition precedent and
U,.me
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that the parents of the deceased grandchild inherited his undivided share.
The court correctly states that the remainder to the grandchildren
vested in those who were living at the death of the testator, Samuel B.
Hoppes. But in its seventh finding the court states that on the death of
the life tenant, John Hinton Hoppes, "each of the fourteen grandchildren
then living became vested with an undivided one-fifteenth fee simple
estate. .. and... the ... parents of Ronald J. Hoppes, deceased.... became
vested with the remaining undivided one-fifteenth fee simple estate there-
in." (Emphasis supplied). The court's use of "vest" to mean vest in inter-
est, then later, to mean vest in possession is unfortunate,
Reminder to "then living issue of my children, ...
per capita and not per stirpes."
The Cleveland Trust Company v. Johnsonq is an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the will of Mary L. Johnson. The will was drafted by her
son, "an able and experienced lawyer." Item IV of this will stated that
Upon the death of the last survivor of my two sons above-named, this
trust shall cease and determine and the entire amount of the principal
thereof ... shall be paid over by the Trustee to the then living issue of my
children, including the issue of my deceased son, Malcolm B. Johnson, per
capita and not per stirpes.
When testatrix executed her will she had no great-grandchildren. But, at
the time for distribution, there were ten grandchildren and sixteen
great-grandchildren, including a great-grandchild who had been conceived.
The court properly directed a per capita distribution among the ten
grandchildren and the sixteen great-grandchildren of testatrix because of
the specific language of the will. But, the statement of the court that the
word "issue," in the absence of qualifying words, includes all degrees of
descendants is somewhat misleading. Although the word "issue" is more
inclusive than "children" or "grandchildren," when there is a gift to the
issue of a named person it has been held that the living descendants ex-
clude their own children and that children of a deceased descendant take
their parent's share.7
If testatrix had not directed a distribution "per capita and not per
stirpes" then descendants of living issue should be excluded by their par-
ents. A per capita distribution of the principal among all lineal descend-
ants is contrary to the normal desires of a testator.8
126 N.E.2d 824 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1954).
T2 Simms, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTs § 427 (1936); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
5 303 (1940); Watson v. Watson, 34 Ohio App. 311, 171 N.E. 257 (1929).
8Note, 7 WEsTERN REs. L. Rv. 186 (1956).
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